Abolishing the Quid Pro Quo and Work Environment Distinctions In Sexual Harassment Cases Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Vinson v. Taylor by Verdonik, Barbara
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 60 
Number 1 Volume 60, Fall 1985, Number 1 Article 8 
June 2012 
Abolishing the Quid Pro Quo and Work Environment Distinctions 
In Sexual Harassment Cases Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: 
Vinson v. Taylor 
Barbara Verdonik 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Verdonik, Barbara (1985) "Abolishing the Quid Pro Quo and Work Environment Distinctions In Sexual 
Harassment Cases Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Vinson v. Taylor," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 60 : 
No. 1 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol60/iss1/8 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ABOLISHING THE QUID PRO QUO AND
WORK ENVIRONMENT DISTINCTIONS
IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964:
VINSON V. TAYLOR
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers
from discriminating against employees or prospective employees
on the basis of sex,1 and affords relief to an employee who has been
subjected to sexual harassment in the work environment.2 Actiona-
1 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964) (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as Title VII]. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1982), states in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's . . . sex . . . or (2) to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would de-
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's . . . sex
Id. See generally Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII. Disparate
Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 305, 306
(1983) (discussing congressional intent of Title VII). Title VII has been viewed as a congres-
sional attempt to rid the workplace of injustice. Id; see also Vaas, Title VII: Legislative
History, 7 B.C. INDUS. AND Co. L. REV. 431, 433-57 (1966) (discussing legislative history of
Title VII).
2 See Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 80 (3d Cir. 1983); Miller v. Bank of
America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979); accord Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F.
Supp. 1382, 1388 (D. Colo. 1978); Munford v. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 466 (E.D.
Mich. 1977).
While there is little legislative history on the Title VII prohibition against sex discrimi-
nation, congressional committees have recognized that it includes a prohibition against sex-
ual harassment. See SUBCOMNL ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REP. COMm ON POST
OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, 96th CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FED-
ERAL GOVERNMENT 153 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter referred to as SUBcoM. ON INVESTI-
GATIONS]; Examinations on Issues Affecting Women in our Nation's Labor Force: Hearings
Before the Sen. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 333 (1981)
[hereinafter referred to as Hearings on Labor].
Guidelines provided by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) state
in relevant part:
[H]arassment on the basis of sex is a violation of ... Title VII. Unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such con-
duct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
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ble sexual harassment exists when a tangible work benefit is condi-
tioned upon the acquiescence to sexual demands 3 -the so-called
quid pro quo situation 4-as well as when an employee is subjected
to a sexually offensive work environment.5 The federal courts of
appeals, however, are not in agreement as to the proper standard
for imputing liability to an employer for sexually harassing acts
committed by supervisory personnel.6 In the quid pro quo situa-
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is
used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a). Sexual harassment also has been defined as "unsolicited nonrecipro-
cal male behavior that asserts a woman's sex role over her function as worker." L. FARLEY,
SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN 14-15 (1978). See generally Oneglia & Cornelius, Sexual Harassment in
the Workplace: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's New Guidelines, 26 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 39, 40-50 (1981) (discussing EEOC definition of sexual harassment).
3 See Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 603-04 (7th Cir. 1985); Katz v.Dole, 709 F.2d
251, 255 n.6 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910-12 (11th Cir.
1982).
" See C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX Dis-
CRIMINATION 32 (1979). The terms "quid pro quo" and "condition of work" were originally
coined by Catherine MacKinnon, who urged that strict liability is warranted in all sexual
harassment cases. Id. at 32, 40, 211.
" See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The
creation of an offensive work environment resulting from sexual harassment can be viewed
as a violation of Title VII because it amounts to sex discrimination with respect to the
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Bundy, 641 F.2d at 943; see 42 U.S.C. §
2000 e-2(a) (1982); see also EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a), supra note 2 (includes
creation of offensive work environment within definition of sexual harassment). See gener-
ally Case Comment, Expanding Title VII to Prohibit a Sexually Harassing Work Environ-
ment, 70 GEo. L.J. 345, 347-51 (1981) (supporting Bundy extension of Title VII claims to
hostile work environment allegations).
6 See Note, Employment Discrimination-Defining an Employer's Liability Under Ti-
tle VII for On-the-Job Sexual Harassment: Adoption of a Bifurcated Standard, 62 N.C.L.
REv. 795, 795-96-(1984). Compare Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044,
1048-49 (3d Cir. 1977) (employer liable for supervisor's misconduct when no remedial action
taken after learning of misconduct) and Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., 552 F.2d 1032,
1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (employer liable if aware of supervisor's improper conduct) with Katz v.
Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 n.6 (4th Cir. 1983) (bifurcated standard imposed-strict liability in
quid pro quo situations and actual or constructive knowledge standard for hostile environ-
ment situations) and Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 985, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (employer
liable for supervisor's sexual harassment when supervisor implicitly or explicitly conditioned
employment benefit on acquiescence to sexual favors).
Some commentators favor strict liability in all sexual harassment cases involving super-
visors or management. See Attanasio, Equal Justice Under Chaos: The Developing Law of
Sexual Harassment, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 30-34 (1981); Case Comment, Sexual Harassment
of Employees Creates Discriminatory Work Environment in Violation of Title VII-Bundy
v. Jackson, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1385, 1395 (1981); see also Lipsig, Sexual Harassment In
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tion, an employer is generally held to be vicariously liable. 7 In con-
trast, the circuits have been reluctant to impose vicarious liability
on an employer, absent a showing of fault, when a supervisor cre-
ates an offensive working atmosphere but does not threaten a tan-
gible employment benefit.8 Recently, in Vinson v. Taylor,9 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that an
employer is liable to an employee who is subjected to a sexually
offensive work environment created by a supervisor notwithstand-
ing the fact that the employer has no knowledge of such
circumstances. 10
In Vinson, the female plaintiff alleged that Taylor, her super-
visor, demanded sexual relations as compensation for hiring her
and that she submitted to his demands only because she feared
losing her job.11 It was further alleged that Taylor caressed her,
the Workplace, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 1 (current trend imposing strict liability
upon employer for supervisor's sexual harassment should be applauded). Other commenta-
tors oppose strict liability when an employer had no actual or constructive notice of a super-
visor's wrongdoings. See Bryan, Sexual Harassment as Unlawful Discrimination Under Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 14 Loy. LA.L. REV. 25, 47-54 (1980); McLain, The
EEOC Sexual Harassment Guidelines: Welcome Advances Under Title VII?, 10 U. BALT. L.
REV. 275, 317-322, 336-37 (1981).
7 See, e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 604-05 (7th Cir. 1985) (employer liable
for quid pro quo sexual harassment regardless of whether employer had notice of supervi-
sor's improper conduct); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 n.6 (4th Cir. 1983) (employer
strictly liable if supervisor conditioned employment benefit on sexual favors); Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d at 910-12 (quid pro quo condition made by supervisor warrants
employer liability even though employer may not have had notice).
8 See, e.g., Katz, 709 F.2d at 255 (employer liable for offensive work environment only
when employer had actual or constructive notice of supervisor's misconduct and took no
remedial action); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982) (when super-
visor creates offensive work environment, employer not liable unless employer knew of or
should have known of supervisor's sexual harassment and failed to take remedial action);
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (employer liable for offensive work
environment when employer had notice of its occurrence). But see Miller v. Bank of
America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979) (making no distinction between types of sexual
harassment; holding employer strictly liable when employer had no notice and took steps to
ensure good working environment.).
Notwithstanding the notice requirement generally asserted by the courts for the offen-
sive work environment situation, the EEOC guidelines have imposed strict liability upon
employers for an offensive work environment created by a supervisor even though an em-
ployer had no notice. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c). According to the EEOC guidelines, it is
also possible to impose liability on an employer when the harassment was committed by a
third-party non-employee or a co-worker if the employer had knowledge or reason to know
of the sexual harassment and failed to take appropriate action. See id. § 1604.11(d)-(e).
9 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
10 Id. at 147, 152.
11 Id. at 143-44.
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followed her into the ladies room, exposed himself to her on a
number of occasions, and raped her.12 Taylor denied all the claims
of sexual harassment s and the employer, Capital City Federal
Savings & Loan Association, asserted that it had no knowledge of
any of his alleged activities.14 Plaintiff took an indefinite sick leave
and was discharged two months later for excessive use of that
leave.15 Plaintiff commenced an action under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 against Taylor and her employer, asserting that
she had been subjected to sexual discrimination as a result of Tay-
lor's conduct.' 6 The district court concluded that plaintiff did not
make out a case of sexual discrimination because she did not lose
any tangible employment benefit as the result of any unlawful con-
dition imposed upon her by her supervisor. 7 However, as a result
of the district court's failure to consider the liability of the defen-
dants with respect to an alleged sexually offensive work environ-
ment created by the supervisor, 8 the court of appeals reversed and
remanded the matter for further proceedings.' 9
Chief Judge Robinson, writing for the court, noted that there
are "at least two separate avenues. . . open to a Title VII plaintiff
for a demonstration of unlawful sex discrimination" 20 -the quid
12 Id. Vinson claimed that Taylor made sexual advances toward other employees. Id. at
144. The district court refused to allow the plaintiff to present direct evidence concerning
the experience of co-workers, but indicated that she could introduce such evidence in rebut-
tal. See Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 38-39 n.1 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd,
753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The court of appeals held that decision to be erroneous,
stating that "evidence tending to show Taylor's harassment of other women working along-
side Vinson is directly relevant to the question whether he created an environment violative
of Title VII." 753 F.2d at 146. As to Vinson's submittal to Taylor's alleged sexual demands
out of fear of losing her job, the court of appeals held that "a victim's capitulation to on-
the-job sexual advances cannot work a forfeiture of her opportunity for redress." Id.
" 753 F.2d at 144. Taylor maintained that plaintiff made her allegations in retaliation
for a business dispute. Id.
"' Id. Despite Vinson's contention that she had informed her employer through a griev-
ance procedure, the district court found that management had no knowledge of Taylor's
actions. Id. at 147 n.43.
Id. at 143.
'e Id. Plaintiff also claimed the existence of a violation of her fifth amendment rights
and a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), but she withdrew those claims after oral arguments in
the district court. Id. at 143 n.12.
7 Id. at 144.
1s Id. at 145. The district court's analysis in Vinson was limited to the quid pro quo
form of sexual harassment. See Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 43
(D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
' Vinson, 753 F.2d at 145, 152.
2 Id. at 144.
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pro quo situation21 and the condition of the work environment. 22
Determining that Vinson's claim was clearly one for an offensive
work environment, 23 Judge Robinson held that "[a]n infringement
of Title VII is not . . .necessarily dependent upon the victim's
loss of employment or promotion. ' 24 Furthermore, the court held
that "Title VII imposes upon an employer without specific notice
of sexual harassment by supervisory personnel responsibility for
that species of discrimination."2 5 Disclaiming any reliance upon
the doctrine of respondeat superior, 6 the court based its holding
on congressional intent27 and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's guidelines. 28 Judge Robinson also employed an anal-
21 Id. at 144-45.
2 Id. at 145.
23 Id. The Vinson court defined a sexually offensive work environment as one in which
an employee is "subjected to 'sexually stereotyped insults' or 'demeaning propositions' that
illegally poison the 'psychological and emotional work environment.'" Id. (quoting Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
24 Vinson, 753 F.2d at 144.
25 Id. at 147; see also Jeppsen v. Wunnicke, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 994, 997
(D. Alaska 1985) (relying on Vinson to impose strict liability on an employer for hostile
work environment). The Vinson court stated that, because the employee perceives that a
supervisor has a significant amount of influence, the employer should be held strictly liable
even when the supervisor had no actual authority of any kind. 753 F.2d at 150.
16 753 F.2d at 150. The doctrine of respondeat superior imposes strict liability upon an
employer for the unauthorized torts committed by an employee while engaged in the scope
of his employment. See H. REusCHMN & W. GREGORY, AGENCY & PARTNERSHIP 101 (1979).
Conduct is within the scope of employment when:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially
within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a
purpose to serve the master, and (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant
against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1957). The Vinson court's explicit denial of the
use of the respondeat superior doctrine is apparently in reaction to the use of this term by
other courts to justify the imposition of liability on an employer in Title VII cases. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979) (respondeat superior applied
when sexual harassment committed by supervisor); see also Significant Development, New
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Employer Liability for Sexual Har-
assment Under Title VII, 61 B.U.L. REv. 535, 539 (1981) (finding employer liable based on
traditional respondeat superior principles would be rare).
2 Vinson, 753 F.2d at 148, 150. While recognizing that the legislative history of Title
VII is virtually silent on the matter of an employer's vicarious liability, the court noted that
Senate debate over analagous matters contained expressions of concern by opponents of the
bill that employers could be held responsible for discriminatory practices over which they
have no control. Id. at 148 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 5820, 8177 (1964) (statements of Sans.
Stennis and Tower)).
2" Vinson, 753 F.2d at 148-49. The EEOC guidelines on sexual discrimination provide
in relevant part: "an employer ... is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and
supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether ... the em-
1985]
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ogy to racial and religious discrimination cases in which employers
have been found strictly liable under Title VII.2 e
Dissenting to a later denial of the defendant's request for a
rehearing en banc,30 Judge Bork asserted that the court's decision
improperly expanded the employer's exposure to vicarious liability
beyond established precedent which required the imposition of lia-
bility only when an employer had knowledge of a supervisor's
wrongdoings.3s
The Vinson Court has now imposed the same standard of
strict liability in all instances involving sexual harassment by a su-
32pervisor. It is submitted that while reaching a just result, the
court failed to explore adequately the rationale behind the exten-
sion of strict liability to employers whose supervisors create offen-
sive work environments without the employers' actual or construc-
ployer knew or should have known of their occurrence." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1985). The
Vinson court concluded that the inclusion of supervisory personnel as "agents" is in accord
with the spirit of Title VII. See 753 F.2d at 149.
29 Vinson, 753 F.2d at 149 & n.67. In racial and religious discrimination cases falling
under Title VII, courts have imposed liability upon the employer regardless of whether
there was notice or fault. See Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144
n.7 (5th Cir. 1975). Cases involving racial and religious discrimination under Title VII do
not discuss notice as a prerequisite to imputing liability to the employer in offensive or
hostile work environment situations. See Calcote v. Texas Educ. Found., 578 F.2d 95, 98
(5th Cir. 1978).
30 Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(per curiam).
31 Id. at 1132-33 (Bork, J., dissenting). Judge Bork noted that prior cases before the
court were, unlike the Vinson case, actions in which the employer was allegedly aware of the
supervisor's sexual harassment. Id. at 1332 (Bork, J., dissenting) (citing Bundy v. Jackson,
641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981) and Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(MacKinnon, J., concurring)). Judge Bork asserted that Barnes and Bundy explicitly lim-
ited the imputation of liability to instances in which an employer was aware of an supervi-
sor's sexual harassment. Vinson, 760 F.2d at 1332 (Bork, J., dissenting). However, the
Bundy court merely noted that Barnes "did suggest" that an employer "might be" relieved
of liability if the supervisor's misconduct contravened employer policy without the em-
ployer's knowledge, and if the employer promptly rectified the offense. See Bundy, 641 F.2d
at 943.
Judge Bork objected to the ruling that the voluntary nature of the acts was irrelevant,
see Vinson, 760 F.2d at 1330 (Bork, J., dissenting), and also to the ruling that permitted the
introduction of evidence tending to show the supervisor's sexual harassment of other em-
ployees, id. at 1331 (Bork, J., dissenting).
22 See Vinson, 753 F.2d at 151-52; Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(employer liable when he knew supervisor was sexually harassing employee creating offen-
sive work environment); cf. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (employer
generally responsible for discriminatory practices of supervisor, but exonerated if situation
rectified upon discovery). Contrary to the assertion of Judge Bork, see supra note 31 and
accompanying text, prior decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit did not explicitly
require knowledge on the part of the employer in all instances of sexual harassment, see
Vinson, 753 F.2d at 147.
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tive knowledge. This Comment will examine the duties and
responsibilities delegated to a supervisor by an employer with re-
spect to the working environment and will submit that the court in
Vinson should have expressly rejected the distinction between of-
fensive work environment and quid pro quo situations.3
THE INVALID DISTINCTION BETWEEN QUID PRO Quo AND WORK
ENVIRONMENT
Courts that distinguish quid pro quo sexual harassment from
the sexually offensive work environment situation often base their
decisions on agency principles3 4 or on the common law notion of
respondeat superior.3 5 These courts posit that the imposition of vi-
carious liability on employers is justified in instances of quid pro
quo harassment because supervisors in such situations utilize the
official authority delegated to them by their employers when they
give employees the choice of either acceding to sexual demands or
" While a male employee can be the victim of sexual harassment in the workplace, and,
pursuant to the definition of sexual harassment as established by the EEOC, would equally
be protected under Title VII, cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (Title VII protects individuals from
sexual harassment in employment); Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, 25 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 563, 564 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (male employee brought suit under Title VII
stemming from homosexual advances which led to termination); see also M. MEYER, L
BERCHTOLD, J. OESTREICH & F. COLLINS, SExUAL HARAssMENT 5 (1981) (survey revealed that
men as well as women receive form of sexual harassment in workplace), this Comment will
focus its discussion on sexual harassment committed by supervisors against female
employees.
For convenience, this Comment will employ male pronouns when referring to employers
and supervisors.
U See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Significant
Development, supra note 26, at 538 (discussion of employer's vicarious liability under Title
VII based on agency principles). In Henson, the court held an employer strictly liable for
the quid pro quo demands made by a supervisor because the supervisor "relie[d] upon his
apparent or actual authority to extort sexual consideration from an employee." 682 F.2d at
910.
" See, e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985) (employer liable
under broad respondeat superior theory); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th
Cir. 1982) (respondeat superior less applicable to offensive work environment); Miller v.
Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979) (non-application of respondeat superior
would create "enormous loophole" in protection afforded by Title VII); see also Hearings on
Labor, supra note 2, at 339 (EEOC guidelines follow "common law standard of respondeat
superior" imposing liability on employer for sexual harassment by supervisor). Reliance on
the respondeat superior doctrine is technically inappropriate because an element of the doc-
trine requires the employee to be pursuing the interests of the master-employer while en-
gaging in the offensive conduct. See Significant Development, supra note 26, at 539. This is
generally not the case when a supervisor sexually harasses an employee. Id.
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forfeiting job benefits, continued employment, or promotion.3
Conversely, it has been asserted that a supervisor is not utilizing
authority delegated to him by his employer when creating a sexu-
ally offensive work environment, but is merely pursuing personal
objectives that are outside the scope of his employment.37 In sexu-
ally offensive work environment cases, liability is usually not im-
posed upon an employer absent a showing of fault such as actual
or constructive knowledge of the supervisor's misconduct.3 8 It is
submitted that the imposition of different standards of liability in
quid pro quo and offensive work environment situations is based
on the erroneous assumption that a supervisor uses official author-
ity only when engaging in quid pro quo harassment.
Due to the hierarchical complexity of modern business organi-
zations, 39 managers and supervisors act as functionaries of the bus-
iness entrepreneur.40 Among other responsibilities, the supervisor's
duties include the organization of the workplace into a "cohesive
and efficient whole that operates with the minimum of disruption
and friction."'41 It is submitted, therefore, that when a supervisor
36 See Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985). In Horn, the court de-
termined that the supervisor's sexual demands were made possible by the delegation of the
employer's powers. Id. In a quid pro quo situation, the supervisor relies on his apparent or
actual authority. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982); see also
Note, supra note 6, at 807 (supervisor acting in official capacity when employment condi-
tioned on return of sexual favors).
37 See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983) (following Henson); Henson
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982) (supervisor acts outside scope of his
authority when he creates sexually offensive work environment); see also McLain, supra
note 6, at 318-21 (unlike non-harassment Title VII cases, courts have imposed differing
standards of liability on employer for supervisors' sexual harassment); Note, supra note 6,
at 808-09 (supervisor creates hostile environment without exercising supervisory powers).
38 See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982); Cummings v.
Walsh Const. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 877 (S.D. Ga. 1983); Coley v. Consolidated Sail Corp.,
561 F. Supp. 645, 650 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
" See D. BROWN, MANAGING THE LARGE ORGANIZATION 111 (1982) (as organizations in-
crease in size, their structures become more complex).
"I See Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985). In Horn, the court noted
that a company is a legal form which acts through appointed agents such as supervisors who
have authority to hire and fire. Id.; see also Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213
(9th Cir. 1979) (no employer, whether corporation, partnership, or sole proprietorship can
function without employees); Calcote v. Texas Educ. Found., 578 F.2d 95, 98 (5th Cir. 1978)
(corporation can only operate through its authorized personnel).
41 B. WALLEY, HANDBOOK OF OFFICE MANAGEMENT 109 (2d ed. 1982). The skills of a su-
pervisor are expected to include the ability to build cooperative efforts and a good working
environment. See G. TERRY & J. STALLARD, OFFICE MANAGEMENT & CONTROL 419 (8th ed.
1980). Managers set the tone which affects the productivity and the financial stability of the
company. See M. MEYER, I. BERCHTOLD, J. OESTREICH & F. COLLINS, supra note 33, at 78; D.
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engages in activity that affects the working environment, he is
clearly acting within the scope of his employment.42 The fact that
an employer may not have specifically directed the supervisor to
create a sexually offensive work environment is not significant; in-
deed such specific direction is no more likely to exist when a super-
visor conditions the loss or gain of employment benefits upon the
return of sexual favors.43 The authority conveyed in both cases is a
general one to promote the efficient use of working operations and
human resources."" Therefore, it is submitted that the distinction
drawn between the two types of sexual harassment, leading courts
and commentators to apply differing standards of employer liabil-
ity, is without merit. Thus, it is submitted that although the Vin-
son Court arrived at a just decision, it should have declared that,
with respect to the delegation of authority, there is no real distinc-
tion between the quid pro quo and work environment situations.
It is suggested that an employee has the right to work in a
congenial atmosphere untainted by racial or sexual slurs.45 Psycho-
logical as well as economic benefits are protected under Title VII.46
STERN, MANAGING HuMAN RESOURCES, THE ART OF FULL EMPLOYMENT 42-57 (1982).
42 The supervisor's conduct can distract the employee so that the employee cannot
properly perform employment duties, thereby altering contractual conditions of employ-
ment. See Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160-61 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
4' See Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985). The Horn court rejected
the argument that an employer should avoid liability because he did not expressly authorize
the supervisor to sexually harass an employee by conditioning an employment benefit on the
receipt of sexual favors. Id.; see Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979).
It is submitted, therefore, that distinguishing the sexually harassing environment situation
from the quid pro quo situation on the ground that the employer does not direct the super-
visor to create an offensive work environment is without justification.
4 See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 913 (11th Cir. 1982) (Clark, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
45 See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (congenial work environ-
ment is "intangible fringe benefit" which deserves protection), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972). Terms and conditions of employment under Title VII means more than tangible
compensation. See Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032 n.13 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1979). A supervisor's misconduct alters the contractual
conditions of the employee's employment. See Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157,
160-61 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
4' See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972). The Rogers court held that a racially discriminatory work environment was actiona-
ble notwithstanding the fact that the employer may have had no discriminatory intent. Id;
see also Gray v. Greyhound Lines East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (psychologically
harmful work environment resulted when managers hired on basis of race in violation of
Title VII); United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 632-35 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (ra-
cially derogatory materials and buttons displayed in workplace permitted by supervisor vio-
lated Title VII). "[A] variety of employment practices which are related not to economic
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It is submitted that the creation of an oppressive work environ-
ment by supervisory personnel through the use of sexual innuen-
does and constant sexual advances hinders an employee's ability to
perform job-related tasks, thereby amounting to a denial of an em-
ployment right. Indeed, such activity has the same effect as quid
pro quo sexual harassment. 47
Some commentators have argued that an employer has more
control over a supervisor's conduct in the quid pro quo situation
than in the work environment situation, thereby justifying the ap-
plication of a knowledge standard in the latter.4 However, cases
dealing with religious and racial discrimination demonstrate that
control is not the basis for the imposition of liability under Title
VII.49 Moreover, it is safe to assume that an employer maintains
fringe benefits but to intangibles, such as psychological impact upon minority employees
from a work environment heavily charged with discrimination, fall within the protection of
the expansive statutory [Title VII] language." City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. at 631. Applying
different standards for sexual discrimination than for racial and religious discrimination
under Title VII would be contrary to Congress' findings. See Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d
599, 606 (7th Cir. 1985).
4 Drawing lines of demarcation between acts that constitute quid pro quo and those
that create an offensive work environment is difficult. See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251,
254-55 (supervisor made quid pro quo sexual proposition and caused hostile work environ-
ment). In Katz, the court indicated that the case could be considered of the quid pro quo
type because the supervisor made quid pro quo demands. This classification was made not-
withstanding that the employee did not actually lose any "tangible" employment benefit. Id.
at 255 n.6. However, the court based its holding on the existence of an offensive work envi-
ronment and remanded the case for a determination as to the employer's knowledge or lack
thereof. Id. at 256. The factual circumstances in Katz illustrate the relationship between
quid pro quo and work environment sexual harassment. Cf. id. at 255 n.6 (under same facts,
plaintiff arguably victim of quid pro quo and condition of work harassment). It is suggested
that quid pro quo demands have the effect of creating a sexually offensive work environ-
ment. In light of their similarities and interrelationships, it is submitted that the quid pro
quo and work environment situations should be treated alike by the courts. See generally
Crull, The Impact of Sexual Harassment on the Job-A Profile of the Experiences of 92
Women, in SEXUALITY IN ORGANIZATIONS: RoMANTIc & COERCIVE BEHAVIORS AT WORK 70 (D.
Neugarten & J. Shafritz eds. 1980) (discussion of effect on employee's ability to perform
employment tasks); L. FARLEY, supra note 2, at 204.
41 See Note, supra note 6, at 804, 809. See generally Note, What Behavior Constituting
Sexual Harassment?, 34 LAB. L.J. 238, 242-43 (1983) (strict liability unwarranted).
"' See Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir. 1977). The Flow-
ers court did not consider whether the employer had the opportunity or the ability to take
corrective action. See id. Rather, the court stated, "[t]he defendant is liable as principal for
any violation of Title VII or section 1981 by [the supervisor] in his authorized capacity as
supervisor." Id. (emphasis added). Cases of racial and religious discrimination under Title
VII generally do not draw a distinction between instances in which an employee lost her job
or other tangible employment benefit and those in which an offensive work environment was
created. Compare Flowers, 552 F.2d at 1282 (liabilty for Title VII violation imputed to em-
ployer) with Calcote v. Texas Educ. Found., 578 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1978) (supervisor's
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sufficient control over the conditions of the work environment to
warrant the imposition of accountability.5 Furthermore, it is sub-
mitted that the imposition of legal responsibility would actually
serve to motivate employers to exert greater control over the work
environment to prevent sexual harassment by supervisors.
racial discrimination which created intolerable work environment and conditions and caused
constructive discharge imposed liability upon employer); Carridi v. Kansas City Chiefs Foot-
ball Club, 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977) (ethnic slurs alone can amount to Title VII viola-
tion and invoke vicarious liability); Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140,
144 n.7 (5th Cir. 1975) (requiring atheist employee attendance at religious prayer meeting
caused intolerable work environment). In Young, the court imposed liability on the em-
ployer notwithstanding the fact that the employee never lodged a complaint to a high-rank-
ing company officer pursuant to company policy, thereby denying the employer an opportu-
nity to control the situation. See Young, 509 F.2d at 144-45.
District court cases concerning racial and religious discrimination under Title VII also
do not draw the types of distinctions that are drawn in sexual harassment cases. See United
States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 635 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); Compston v. Bordon, Inc.,
424 F. Supp. 157, 160 (S.D. Ohio 1976). In Compston, the court held that the employee did
not lose any tangible employment benefit as a result of the supervisor's derogatory com-
ments of the jewish faith. 424 F. Supp. at 161-62. However, without making distinctions
based upon an employer's ability to control a supervisor's acts, the Compston court ren-
dered judgment against the employer for the offensive work environment created by his
supervisor's verbal abuse. Id. at 162. In City of Buffalo, liability was imposed upon the city,
acting as employer, for the creation of an offensive work environment as well as for the
denial of tangible employment benefits even though the City's Commission had no knowl-
edge of the wrongdoings. 457 F. Supp. at 635, 639-40; see also S. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1971) (discrimination against women should be treated no differently than discrimi-
nation based on race). It is submitted that requiring notice before an employer can be held
liable to a sexually harassed employee for an offensive work environment is contrary to the
intended effect of Title VII.
50 See D. BROWN, supra note 39, at 198-205. Management has the ability to make the
environment more suitable to the characteristics, values, and needs of employees. Id. Em-
ployers can effectively use formal grievance procedures to curb sexual harassment. See
Foucher & McCulloch, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace-What Should the Employer
Do?, in SEXUALITY IN ORGANIZATIONS-RoMANTIC COERCIVE BEHAVIOR AT WORK 89-91 (D.
Neugarten & J. Shafritz eds. 1980). There are many other measures an employer can take to
maintain a working environment free of sexual harassment. See VERMONT ADVISORY COMM.
TO THE US. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE GOVERNOR'S COMM. ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN,
SExUAL HARASsMENT ON THE JOB, A GUIDE FOR EMPLOYERS 16 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
VERMONT ADVISORY COMm.]; Hill & Behrens, Love in the Office: A Guide for Dealing with
Sexual Harassment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 30 DE PAUL L. REV.
581, 614-22 (1981). Employers should direct their attention to organizational design, direc-
tion, human resources, control, and feedback to minimize sexual harassment in the work-
place. See M. MEVE, I. BERCHTOLD, J. OESTREICH & F. COLLINS, supra note 33, at 85-107.
Employers can ensure that supervisors will maintain a work environment free of sexual har-
assment by basing job performance evaluations on the supervisor's ability to maintain a
harmonious work atmosphere and by providing employees with information on their rights
and the channels they are to take to enforce those rights. See B. WALLEY, supra note 41, at
101.
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THE KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT: AN UNDUE BURDEN ON THE
VICTIMIZED EMPLOYEE
Those who oppose the application of strict liability in work
environment cases often argue that the imposition of liability is
unfair when the employer is unaware of his supervisor's wrongdo-
ings.5 It is submitted, however, that the knowledge requirement
places an excessive burden on the victim of sexual harassment to
inform an unsuspecting employer. Victims of sexual harassment
are often afraid to circumvent the normal chain of command be-
cause they fear that they will be blamed, ostracized or fired.5 2 Em-
ployees are often unable to take the risk of informing their em-
ployer of a supervisor's misconduct in light of their economic
vulnerability. 3 Furthermore, many employees perceive that man-
agement will not take their complaints seriously.5 The possibility
51 See, e.g., Conte & Gregory, Sexual Harassment in Employment - Some Proposals
Towards More Realistic Standards of Liability, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 407, 411-12 n.18 (unfair
to impose liability upon employer when employer without notice of sexual harassment);
Note, supra note 6, at 810 (fairest standard of liability must be assigned to each form of
sexual harassment).
"2 See U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, WORKSHOP ON SExuAL HARASSMENT 10
(1980). The effects of sexual harassment include feelings of powerlessness, fear, anger, ner-
vousness, decreased job satisfaction, and diminished ambition. Hearings on Labor, supra
note 2, at 524. Specifically, studies reveal that, among other things, sexually harassed
women are often fired, forced to resign, or barred from promotions and other benefits. Id. at
168-69.
The type of insensitivity sometimes encountered by victimized employees is exemplified
by the facts of Bundy v. Jackson. See 641 F.2d 934, 939-41 (D.C. Cir. 1981). After being
subjected to continual sexual insults and demeaning propositions from her supervisor, the
plaintiff notified her superiors, who also failed to take her complaint seriously and made
sexually harassing remarks themselves. Id. at 939-40. Following the plaintiff's complaint of
sexual harassment to the EEOC, the plaintiff claimed that the supervisors retaliated by
criticizing her work. Id. at 941. She pursued her complaint by way of informal and then
formal meetings conducted by the EEOC. Id. After receiving "satisfactory" ratings for work
performance, plaintiff was found eligible for promotion. Id. The District of Columbia Circuit
imposed vicarious liability on the employer, holding that an offensive work environment
violates Title VII and warrants the imposition of liability. Id. at 941-46.
" See SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 13. The resulting economic loss
from informing an employer of a supervisor's harassment often includes the loss of seniority
in employment or even dismissal. See id. at 12. Employees are sometimes unable to take
action against unwanted sexual harassment because they cannot afford to secure legal assis-
tance. See VERMONT ADVISORY COMM., supra note 50, at 9. Employees are sometimes reluc-
tant to risk dismissal because they lack the skills and experience necessary for other em-
ployment. Id. at 10.
" See SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 12. Managers are reluctant to rec-
ognize that sexual harassment in the workplace is a problem. Id.; see also Bundy v. Jackson,
641 F.2d 934, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (supervisor dismissed claims of sexual harassment with-
out investigation); Middleton, Sexual Harassment on the Job: New Rules Issued, 60 A.BA_
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of retaliation by a supervisor while an employer investigates a
claim of sexual harassment also poses a dilemma to a victimized
employee.55 It is submitted, therefore, that the knowledge neces-
sary to impute liability to the employer will rarely exist because
the very conditions that the employer creates and fosters may pre-
vent incidents of sexual harassment from ever coming to his atten-
tion. Thus, it is suggested that sexual harassment in the workplace
environment, which has come to be recognized as a serious prob-
lem today,56 may never be mitigated without expunging the knowl-
edge requirement and imposing an affirmative duty on the part of
the employer to take preventive measures.5 7 The knowledge re-
J. 703, 703 (1980) (statements of Nancy Kreiter, research director of Women Employed in
Chicago). Believing that management will not give their complaints credence, many victim-
ized women have chosen to quit their jobs rather than file complaints. See Waks & Starr,
The "Sexual Shakedown" in Perspective: Sexual Harassment in its Social & Legal Con-
texts, 7 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 567, 569 (1982). The imposition of liability upon employers will
encourage them to confront the problem of sexual harassment in the workplace. See C.
MACKINNON, supra note 4, at 211.
"I See VERMONT ADVISORY COMM., supra note 50, at 9. An investigation performed by a
House subcommittee disclosed that most women subjected to sexual harassment do not file
a complaint. See SUBcoM- ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 11. Women are aware that
employers can acquiesce to continued misconduct by supervisors while they superficially
investigate a sexual harassment claim. See L. FARLEY, supra note 2, at 147.
" See SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 1, 21. The Subcommittee on In-
vestigations of the House of Representatives found serious widespread sexual harassment in
the federal workplace, warranting corrective action. Id. "The damages suffered by the victim
of sexual harassment are as serious and severe as those suffered by the victims of any other
tort." Lipsig, supra note 6, at 1, col. 1. While Title VII was designed to guard against em-
ployment discrimination, adequate enforcement may be lacking and further congressional
action may be necessary. See Hearings on Labor, supra note 2, at 1. "Discrimination against
women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited employment practices.. . ." H.R.
REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971); see also Hearings on Labor, supra note 2, at 2
(sexual discrimination in workplace a pervasive social and economic evil in today's econ-
omy); U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD OFFICE OF MERIT REvIEW AND STUDIES, SEX-
UAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: Is IT A PROBLEM? 5 (1981) (42% of female and
15.3% of male federal employees sexually harassed over two-year period); Collins & Blodg-
ett, Sexual Harassment ... some see it ... some won't . 59 HARv. Bus. RE V. 76, 84
(Mar.-Apr. 1981).
17 See Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985). Eleanor Holmes Norton,
Chairman of EEOC during the House subcommittee investigation in 1980 indicated, "it
would be naive to rely on complaints alone to handle sexual harassment. To do so places an
unfair burden on women to come forward in a situation that is extremely difficult for the
average person." See SuBcom. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 13. It has been asserted
that before the EEOC guidelines imposing strict liability upon the employer were issued,
"there were no teeth in the laws" governing sexual harassment. See Middleton, supra note
54, at 703. Section 1604.11(f) of the EEOC guidelines acknowledges that "[p]revention is the
best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment" and recognizes that it is the duty of
employers to take steps to prevent it. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f); see Note, Legal Remedies for
19851
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quirement thwarts Congress' intent in enacting Title VII by failing
to promote the elimination of sexual discrimination. s
CONCLUSION
The extent of an employer's exposure to vicarious liability
under Title VII for the acts of its supervisors is predicated upon
the delegation of authority. The distinction between the quid pro
quo and the condition of work environment situations drawn by
some federal courts of appeals is unjustified because employers
delegate to their supervisors the authority to maintain a good
working environment-and that environment constitutes a signifi-
cant employment right. Furthermore, the knowledge standard,
which is generally imposed only in offensive work environment
cases, places an excessive burden on the victim of sexual harass-
ment to inform her employer. The holding of Vinson v. Taylor is a
welcome step toward imputing liability upon the party best able to
control the atmosphere in the working environment. Employers
can and should take preventive measures against sexual harass-
ment, thereby equalizing the opportunity for all employees to per-
form their jobs effectively and to achieve job advancement.
Barbara Verdonik
Employment-Related Sexual Harassment, 64 MINN. L. REv. 151, 159 (1979) (employers bet-
ter equipped to bear costs of employee's sexual misconduct). "It was Congress' judgment
that employers, not the victims of discrimination, should bear the cost .... The strict
liability rule is admirably suited for this purpose." Horn, 755 F.2d at 605. While employers
may not be able to control the thoughts and beliefs of their employees, they can train and
sensitize employees so that they conduct themselves appropriately. See Hearings on Labor,
supra note 2, at 531.
5 See Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605-06 (7th Cir. 1985) (notice requirement
does not comport with purpose of Title VII). Title VII seeks to place women on equal foot-
ing with men, impose stringent demands upon employers and "strike at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes." United States v.
City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 629 (W.D.N.Y. 1978). Title VII was intended to "elimi-
nate such irrational impediments to job opportunities and enjoyment which have plagued
women in the past." Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.) (em-
phasis added), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); see also Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238
(5th Cir. 1971) (racial discrimination creating offensive work environment violates Title
VII), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). The Rogers Court held that Title VII should be
accorded liberal interpretations to effectuate congressional intent. 454-F.2d at 238.
[Vol. 60:177
